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Notre Dame, 1998, p. 152). The traditional conceptions of theism, based as
they are on the book of Genesis, contain within them the seeds of a universal love, one which extends one's understanding of what sort of person is
to be the object of my benevolence to all of humankind based upon each
person's possession of the imago dei, and not just upon the contingent features of virtues I require for flourishing. For Christians, the parable of the
Good Samaritan underscores that it is the enemy I encounter along the
way, and not just the stranger happening into my community, that is the
object of virtuous neighborliness. TI.us, while one could make the case for
placing normative priority upon family and friends in most instances, the
reach of misericordia extends to the entire community of divine imagebearers, and can necessitate departure from if not harm to that local community, as is the case with a Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a Mother Teresa, or a
William Carey.

Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evils and the Goodness of God. Cornell
University Press, Ithaca and London, 1999. Pp.xi + 220. No price given.
BRlAN DAVIES, Fordham University
If there is a problem of evil, how should we state it? And how should we
deal with it? A common line of thinking holds that the problem is either a
logical or an evidentialist one, that it can be summarized by questions like
"em we consistently believe both in the reality of Cod and in the reality of
evil?" or " Does evil render God's existence improbable or unlikely?" But
how should we engage with the problem of evil considered in these terms?
One way would be to start with a definition of the word "God" and with
one or more premises concerning what the definition entails when it comes
to what might or might not be expected in a world made by God. One
might then seek to show either that evil is impossible or unlikely in such a
world (our world), or that it is possible or even positively explicable.
Yet what should we take "God" to mean? And what premises might
we subsequently invoke so as to challenge or defend belief in God's existence? For many contemporary philosophers "God" means "an all-powerful. all-knowing, morally impeccable person who will always prevent evil
if morally obliged to do so and if able to do so". Much recent discussion of
the problem of evil has therefore been concerned with suggesting that God
either lacks or has morally sufficient reason for permitting the evil that
occurs. Evil, so it is frequently said, is of two kinds: moral (the morally bad
choices of created agents, together with their consequences) and natural
(nalurally occurring states or processes of an undesirable kind). To some
philosophers it seems that both moral and natural evil could have no place
in a world governed by an all-powerful. all-knowing morally impeccable
person (the conclusion being that God cannot or probably does not exist). To
others it seems either that evil is not demonstrably incompatible with the
existence of such a person, or that such a person has good moral reason for
permitting it (the conclusion being either that evil and God are compossi-
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ble or that one can offer a persuasive theodicy which indicates why there is
there is the evil that there is). And it is with an eye on such approaches
(represented in recent literature by authors such as J.L. Mackie, Alvin
Plantinga, William Rowe and Richard Swinburne) that Marilyn Adams
writes in this book. But her aim is not to show that one or other of them is
right. Rather, she seeks to recommend a change of direction to philosophers concerned with the problem of evil. For her view is that "the structure of any fair-minded debate about the problem of evil will be much
more complicated" than recent literature has made it seem (p.13). One
should not, she argues, discuss the problem only with respect to whether
and how evil in general can or cannot be shown to be consistent or inconsistent with belief in the existence of God. Instead, she holds, one should
focus on particular evils ("horrendous" ones). And, so she adds, parties to
discussions on the problem of evil should take note of living religious traditions and of the values embraced both by those who subscribe to them
and by others whose values are significantly relevant when it comes to
reflecting on God and evil.
What does Adams mean by "horrendous evils"? She takes the phrase to
signify "evils the participation in which (that is, the doing or suffering of
which) constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant's
life could (given their inclusion in it) be a great good to him/her on the
whole" (p.26). What would be examples? According to Adams, they
would include "the rape of a woman and axing off of her arms, psychophysical torture whose ultimate goal is the disintegration of personalities,
betrayal of one's deepest loyalties, child abuse of the sort described by Ivan
Karamazov, child pornography, parental incest, slow death by starvation,
the explosion of nuclear bombs over populated areas" (ibid.) What makes
such evils so pernicious, says Adams, "is their life-ruining potential, their
power prima facie to degrade the individual by devouring the possibility
of positive personal meaning in one swift gulp '" horrors afflict persons
insofar as they are actual or potential meaning-makers" (pp.27 f.). But why
does Adams focus so specifically on them? She does so because they cannot, in her view, be reconciled with the goodness of God by an argument
intended to show that evil in general is not demonstrably impossible or
unlikely in a world made by God, or by an argument designed to show
that God has reason for permitting evil in general. According to Adams,
"where entrenched evils are figured into the bargain, it is far from obvious
that a perfectly good God would accept them as the price of a very good
world with as favorable a balance of moral good over evil as God could
weakly actualize" (p.30). Why? Because God's goodness must mean that
he values "the individual qua person" (p.31). More precisely, it must mean
that horrendous evils should be defeated in that those afflicted by them end
up having lives which are a great good to them" on the whole by balancing
off serious evils" (p.31). "For God to be good to a created person", says
Adams, "God must guarantee him/her a life that is a great good to hirnlher
on the whole and one in which any participation in horrors is defeated
within the context of his/her own life ... For a person's life to be a great
good to him/her on the whole, it is not enough that his/her life be objectively full of positive meaning or that these meanings be appreciated by
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others; s/he must recognize and appropriate meanings sufficient to render
it worth living" (p.156)
In developing this proposal Adams's strategy is "to consider a variety of
contrasting positions and to probe the resources of each for showing how
an omnipotent, omniscient and perfectly good God could defeat horrors
within the context of the participants' lives" (p.179). But what positions and
resources does Adams have in mind? An important claim for her is that
God is personal. "Divine personhood", she says, "offers systematic advantages where the problem of horrendous evils is concerned. For horrordef,!ating power is meaning-restoring power, and meaning-making is personal activity par excellence!" (p.81). Yet how shall we understand divine
personhood? With a view to this question Adams draws attention to theologies which leave room for divine understanding and choice while also
sharply distinguishing between God and creatures. And she defends the
claim that God is the source of value rather than a figure subject to moral
duties and obligations. She also insists that creatures depend on God for
their being and for the exercise of their causal powers. God's action, she
argues, is "agency enabling" (p.84). She admits that "when it comes to
de6~ating horrors, Divine passibility seems prima facie to afford certain systematic advantages" (p.83 and Chapter 8). But she is also unhappy with
views of God's power which deny that it includes "power to produce
supranatural effects - those that lie outside, go beyond any that created
natural powers could produce" (p.84). For Adams, therefore, God's personhood entails that God can act so as to give value to human lives both by
being a standard by which lives are to be judged as valuable and by being
able creatively to bring about lives which can be found valuable.
In expounding and defending this conclusion, Adams adopts a twofold
strategy. First she draws attention to a range of things which some have
thought to be good or valuable (her intention being to indicate how, while
going beyond sources and notions employed by some familiar contemporary essays on the problem of evil, one might find one's life to be good
overall). Second, she indicates how we might think of God as acting so as
to leave participants in horrendous evils convinced that their lives are full
of positive significance. In doing all this (and as well as doing more than
this review can note) Adams offers: (1) an exploration of the notions of
purity and defilement (designed to consider ways in which one might take
people and God to be related); (2) an exploration of the notions of honor
and shame (with special emphasis on biblical texts and on the notion of
God as honoring us); (3) a defense of the claim that aesthetic values are
important when it comes to a sound philosophical discussion of the problem of evil since "paradigm value is one and [since] Divine Goodness to created persons is at least in part a function of endowing their lives with valuable aesthetic features" (p.149); (4) an emphasis on the conclusion that horrendous evils can only be finally "trumped" by a redeeming activity of
God which guarantees to all people a state of permanent happiness with
God (so what is sometimes called "the doctrine of universal salvation" is
very much a part of Adams's answer to the challenge of horrendous evils,
one which she offers while paying special respect to the fourteenth century
English writer Julian of Norwich); (5) a firm recommendation of the impor-
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tance of what Adams takes to be the Christian doctrines of the Trinity and
the Incarnation (Adams maintains that "it is God's becoming a human
being, experiencing the human condition from the inside, from the viewpoint of a finite human consciousness, that integrates the experience into
an incommensurately valuable relationship" [p.168]).
In concluding her discussion, Adams tells us that the "direction" of her
attempted solutions to the problem of horrendous evils lilies in pointing to
the incommensurate Good that God is and to ways that God could be and
act to ensure that participants in horrors have lives full of positive meaning" (p.189). But why should we concede the premise on which her whole
discussion is based? Why should we suppose that "horrendous evils" are
special in the way that she suggests? As far as I can see, she mostly seems
just to assume that the goodness of God is seriously compromised if people involved in horrendous evils cannot end up effectively being grateful
for them. Yet one might equally argue that God's goodness is no less compromised by the fact that there is any evil at all. And one might reasonably
suggest that, when it comes to the problem of evil, little of substance is
achieved by addressing the topic of horrendous evils rather than the topic
of evil in general. On the other hand, however, Adams's attempts to show
how horrendous evils might be defeated are surely worthwhile whether or
not one thinks that they are needed in order to show that evil does not render God's existence either impossible or unlikely. For, regardless of the
problem of evil, the horrors which vex Adams have special features (as she
indicates) which are very much worth considering when it comes to how
we might think of ourselves in relation to God. And it is well worth asking
how they might look when viewed against the range of perspectives (evaluative and Biblical) that Adams highlights.
Yet what of the account which Adams finally offers to indicate how horrendous evils might be defeated? One of its strengths lies in its stress on
the difference between God and creatures. Take, for example, its claim that
we do well not to think of God as a moral agent whose life and actions are
to be judged in the way in which we judge the lives and actions of people.
Classical authors such as Augustine and Aquinas would have found the
thought to be obviously true. But it is rarely encountered in contemporary
philosophy of religion, especially in discussions of the problem of evil,
which often basically boil down to arguments concerning whether or not
God is well-behaved. One might argue, as many do, that God's goodness
has to be moral (that God has to be well behaved) since there is no other way
for God to be good. But, as others have argued, that is a response which
admits of reply on philosophical and biblical grounds, and in the light of
ways in which God has been spoken about by Christians since the time of
the New Testament. And Adams's rebuttal of it should be taken seriously.
The same might be said of her treatment of God and human agency (in
which she argues that God, without violating our human nature, can make
us the people we end up becoming). Adams holds back from boldly
embracing Aquinas's provocative doctrine that all human free actions are
caused by God (d. In peri henri, book I, lectio 14). But what she says comes
very close to Aquinas's view of how God makes us to be what and who we
are. And she develops her discussion in a fruitful and intelligent way.
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But then, alas, there is Hell. Adams firmly relies on the hope that God
can somehow bring it about that everyone shall enjoy bliss with him. She is
an unrepentant believer in the salvation of all human beings and the Lmreality of Hell. And one might well wish to take one's hat off to her on that
score. For the scenario she envisages is agreeable. How nice to think that
all of us shall end with the joy of the beatific vision. But Adams gives us no
serious reason to think that all of us shall do that. And she goes against
New Testament and other Christian writings in supposing that everyone
shall attain a state of contentment which leaves them reconciled to what has
happened to them in this life and to what they have done in it. Adams, of
course, knows this very well, so I am here merely drawing attention to a
way of criticizing her book of which she is certainly aware. But the criticism
is pertinent. And it is pertinent from the viewpoint of philosophy of religion
when it comes to the problem of evil. Could it be that justice requires that
some people are simply damned? There are familiar arguments for concluding that it does. If they are cogent, however, horrendous evils cannot
be defeated as Adams would like to think that they might be.

Providence and the Problem of Evil, by Richard Swinburne. Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998. Pp. xiv, 263. $65.00 (cloth), $19.95 (paper).
PHlLIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame
This book is the final volume in Richard Swinburne's tetralogy on philosophical topics in Christian doctrine. It was preceded by Responsibility and
Atonement (1989), Revelation (1991) and The Christian God (1994). Before he
produced the tetralogy, Swinburne had published a trilogy on philosophical theology whose members are The Coherence of Theism (1977), The
Exi5 tence of God (1979) and Faith a1ld Reason (1981). Judged ill. terms of their
combination of scope and quality, these seven volumes add up, in my
opinion, to the most impressive body of work produced in analytic philosophy of religion during the twentieth century.
The book has four parts. In the first, which consists of two chapters,
Swinburne explains why he thinks Christians need a theodicy in order to
respond adequately to the problem of evil and then briefly surveys the
resources Christian tradition provides to the theodicist. As he understands
it, a theodicy is "not an account of Cod's actual reasons for allowing a bad
state to occur, but an account of his possible reasons (i.e. reasons which
Coel has for allowing the bad state to occur, whether or not those are the
ones which motivate him)" (p. 15). A theodicy thus understood is, as he
observes in a footnote, akin to what other philosophers, for example, Alvin
Plantinga, describe as a defense. Swinburne holds that God may allow a
bad state, E, to occur just in case (a) God has the right to allow E to occur;
(b) allowing E (or a state as bad or worse) to occur is the only morally permissible way in which God can bring about a logically necessary condition
of a good, G; (c) Cod does everything else logically possible to bring about
G; and (d) the expected value of allowing E, given (c), is positive. He

